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THE PRESSURE OF PRECEDENT: A 
CRITIQUE OF THE CONSERVATIVE 
APPROACHES TO STARE DECISIS 
IN ABORTION CASES 
Michael J. Gerhardt* 
INTRODUCTION 
The last thing one would have expected the Rehnquist Court to 
do was to reaffirm Roe v. Wade.' After all, Presidents Reagan and 
Bush had each campaigned in part on the ground that they would 
appoint Justices who would overturn Roe,2 and the Justices they 
appointed to replace five out of the original seven-member majority 
in Roe3 wasted little time in trying to dismantle Roe. By 1989, in 
• Associate Professor, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of William and 
Mary. B.A. 1978, Yale University; M.Sc. 1979, London School of Economics; J.D. 1982, 
University of Chicago. I am grateful to Paul Marcus, Bill Treanor, Ron Wright and the 
participants in the Boston University School of Law Faculty Workshop for their helpful com-
ments on earlier drafts; and to Vanessa Elliott and Susan Korzick for their diligent research 
assistance. 
I. 410 U.S. I 13 (1973). 
2. See, e.g., E.J. Dionne, Jr. The Abortion Foes Hail Gains In Reagan Era, N.Y. Times, 
Dec. 24, 1988, § I, at 8, col. I (referring to President-elect Bush's "(p]residential campaign 
promise to appoint judges who opposed abortions"); Gerald M. Boyd, Bush. in Iowa, Clarifies 
Stand on Legal Abortions, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1987, § B, at 9, col. I (quoting then-Vice-
President Bush as declaring on the campaign trail, "I oppose abortion, I oppose Federal 
funding for abortion. [I] want to see the Roe v. Wade decision changed so that it won't 
legalize abortion."); Stuart Taylor, Jr., Whoever Is Elected, Potential Is Great For Change in 
High Court's Course, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1984, § I, at 30, col. I (citing President Reagan's 
endorsement of the Republican platform "call[ing] for [the] appointment of judges at all 
levels who respect 'the sanctity of innocent human life' " and "will[ingness] to continue to 
appoint Supreme Court and other Federal judges who share [his] commitment to judicial 
restraint"). 
3. The original majority in Roe consisted of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Douglas, 
Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun and Powell. See Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (cited in note I); 
id. at 168 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 183-84, 207 (1973) 
(Burger, C.J., concurring) (applicable to Roe and Doe, in which the Court struck down Geor-
gia's statutes (I) criminalizing most abortions, except those certified by a physician as being 
necessary to save the life or health of the mother and to prevent the birth of a child conceived 
through a rape or with severe and irremediable mental or physical defects, and (2) requiring 
all noncriminal abortions comply with nine conditions, including performance in a licensed 
hospital); id. at 179 (Douglas, J., concurring) (applicable to Roe and Doe). The two dissent-
ers in Roe were Justices White and Rehnquist. See note 5. President Ford appointed Justice 
Stevens to replace Justice Douglas. President Reagan appointed Sandra Day O'Connor, 
Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy to replace Justices Stewart, Rehnquist and Powell, 
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Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,4 all four of President Rea-
gan's appointees to the Court-Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy-joined Justice Whites to weaken 
Roe severely by broadening state authority to regulate abortions. 
Moreover, the nomination and confirmation of Justice Thomas in 
1991 seemed to ensure a pivotal vote for Roe's overruling: he had 
publicly condemned Roe prior to his becoming a federal appellate 
judge;6 and, once on the Court, he joined many of Justice Scalia's 
calls for overruling various liberal precedents. 1 Justice Thomas also 
authored his own invitations to overrule well-established lines of de-
cisions applying the Eighth Amendment to confinement conditionss 
and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to limit the 
admission of hearsay evidence in criminal trials.9 
respectively; and President Reagan appointed then-Justice Rehnquist to replace Chief Justice 
Burger. President Bush appointed David Souter to replace Justice Brennan and Clarence 
Thomas to replace Justice Marshall. 
4. 492 u.s. 490 (1989). 
5. Justice White and Justice Rehnquist dissented in Roe. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 171 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Doe, 410 U.S. at 221 (White, J., dissenting) (applicable to Roe and 
Doe). 
6. See, e.g., Clarence Thomas, Why Black Conservatives Should Look to Conservative 
Policies, Speech to Heritage Foundation, June 18, 1987 (praising Lewis Lehrman's critique of 
Roe and discussion of "the meaning of the right to life [a]s a splendid example of applying 
natural law"); White House Working Group on the Family, The Family: Preserving 
America's Future 12 (1986) (a report to which then-Chairman Thomas of the EEOC was a 
signatory criticizing Roe and several other decisions as "fatally flawed" rulings that should be 
"corrected" either by constitutional amendment or through the "appointment of new judges 
and their confirmation in the Senate"); see also Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law Back-
ground of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 Harv. J.L. & 
Pub. Pol. 63, 63 n.2 (1989) (after repeating the holdings of Roe and Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479 (1965), Thomas noted that he "elaborate[d] on my misgivings about activist 
judicial use of the Ninth Amendment" in Clarence Thomas, Civil Rights as a Principle Versus 
Civil Rights as an Interest, in David Boaz, ed., Assessing the Reagan Years 398-99 (Cato 
Institute, 1988) (describing Griswold as a judicial "invention" and defending Robert Bork's 
position that the Ninth Amendment and the Constitution do not authorize such judicial ac-
tivism because it would give the Court a "blank check")). 
7. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Judicial Activism: Justice Thomas Hits the Ground 
Running, N.Y. Times, Mar. I, 1992, § 4, at I, col. 4; Ruth Marcus, Early Returns Show 
Justice Thomas As Advertised: Conservative, Washington Post, Mar. I, 1992, at A6, col. I. 
8. See Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1004 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(joined only by Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas argued that the Eighth Amendment's ban on 
cruel and unusual punishment did not protect prisoners from beatings by guards unless the 
prisoners suffered serious injuries, and scolded the seven-member majority, including Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, for adhering to precedents requiring reconsideration because they "cut the 
Eighth Amendment loose from its historical moorings" by applying it to both punishment 
and confinement conditions). 
9. See White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 746 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the Court should have reexamined the Court's 
Confrontation Clause precedents because "[t]he standards that the Court has developed to 
implement its assumption that the Confrontation Clause limits admission of hearsay evidence 
have no basis in the text of the Sixth Amendment" and that he "wr[o]te separately only to 
suggest that our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence has evolved in a manner that is perhaps 
inconsistent with the text and history of the Clause itself"). 
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Yet, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,w the unexpected hap-
pened: a bare majority of the Rehnquist Court, surprisingly includ-
ing Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, expressly reaffirmed 
Roe. Casey shattered the image of a monolithic mind-set among the 
Reagan and Bush Justices favoring the overruling of various liberal 
precedents, including Roe. Casey exposed deep-seated divisions 
within the Rehnquist Court's conservatives both about whether the 
Constitution protects the right to have an abortion and about the 
role of precedent in constitutional decisionmaking. The decision re-
vealed an even split among the Reagan and Bush Justices over 
whether the legitimacy of the Court's decisionmaking depended 
more on upholding liberal constitutional precedents to promote sta-
bility, certainty and predictability in constitutional law or on over-
ruling such decisions to restore certain fundamental constitutional 
values. Casey also severely undermined the conventional wisdom 
that precedents rarely, if ever, constrain the Justices to make deci-
sions they would prefer not to make.11 
This essay analyzes the ramifications of Casey for understand-
ing contemporary conservative Justices' views on the role of prece-
dent in constitutional decisionmaking. It evaluates not the 
substantive merits of Casey but rather the relative strengths of the 
different arguments regarding constitutional stare decisis put for-
ward in Casey by the Reagan and Bush appointees to the Rehnquist 
Court. 
Drawing on a series of decisions culminating in Casey, Part I 
examines the two conservative approaches to constitutional stare 
decisis competing for dominance on the Rehnquist Court. Justices 
O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter take a classically conservative ap-
proach (often the basis for criticizing the Warren Court)12 that ad-
herence to prior constitutional values breeds stability, certainty and 
predictability in constitutional law; disrupts constitutional doctrine 
as little as possible and only when necessary; and permits incremen-
tal decisionmaking building on the judgment of prior Justices and 
the lessons of experience. In contrast, Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices Scalia and Thomas argue that overruling erroneously rea-
soned decisions will best preserve the legitimacy of the Court's deci-
sionmaking, revive certain constitutional values and endure due to 
10. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
II. See, e.g., Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principle in Constitutional 
Adjudication, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 401, 402 (1988); James C. Rehnquist, Note, The Power That 
Shall Be Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis, The Constitution, and The Supreme Court, 66 
B.U. L. Rev. 345, 371-75 (1986). 
12. See note 13. 
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the strength of their reasoning and the probability of a solid con-
servative majority on the Court for the foreseeable future. 
Part II critiques the two conflicting conservative approaches to 
precedent in Casey. On the one hand, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy 
and Souter failed to reconcile their express reaffirmation of Roe 
with the full panoply of reasons for judicial fidelity to precedent and 
with their decisions in Casey to overrule Roe's trimester framework 
and parts of two other abortion rulings. On the other hand, the 
Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas underestimated the 
degree to which their dissents in Casey seemingly rewarded political 
forces bent on reshaping the Court. These three Justices also over-
estimated the likelihood that a decision to overrule Roe would pre-
clude substantial instability in constitutional law: if they had 
prevailed in Casey, their victory almost certainly would have pro-
voked other presidents to appoint Justices who would resurrect Roe 
and overrule as erroneously reasoned the decision overturning Roe. 
Part II concludes that the Rehnquist-Scalia-Thomas approach is 
less likely to dominate the Court than the O'Connor-Kennedy-Sou-
ter alternative. Despite any problems in its application the latter 
approach tracks the overwhelming trend of Justices to overrule 
precedents only if there are compelling reasons to do so, and strikes 
a more reasonable balance between normative views of how the 
Court should decide abortion-rights cases and the Court's need to 
promote stability and continuity in constitutional law. 
I 
For years, conservatives have attacked the Warren Court for 
abandoning the values normally associated with judicial fidelity to 
precedent.D These values include the preservation of neutrality, 
consistency, equality and stability in constitutional decisionmaking 
and the legitimation of judicial review through the Court's accept-
ance of its own decisions as binding rules of law .14 Yet, within the 
past year and a half, the conservatives on the Rehnquist Court have 
found themselves at odds over the degree to which they should ad-
here to precedents with whose reasoning or holdings they disagree. 
13. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of Ameni:a: The Political Seduction of the 
Law 130, 348-49 (Free Press, 1990); Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transfor-
mation of the Fourteenth Amendment 344-46 (Harv. U. Press, 1977).; Philip B. Kurland, 
Politics, the Constitution, and the Wa"en Court 37-38, 90-91 (U. Chi. Press, 1970). 
14. See generally Arthur J. Goldberg, Equal Justice: The Warren Era of the Supreme 
Court 15 (Nw. U. Press, 1971); Richard A. Wasserstrom, The Judicial Decision: Toward a 
Theory of Legal Jusitification 56-84 (Stanford U. Press, 1961); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role 
of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 68, 70-71 
(1991); Geoffrey R. Stone, Precedent, the Amendment Process, and Evolution in Constitutional 
Doctrine, II Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. 67, 70 (1988). 
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On at least three occasions, culminating in Casey, they have sharply 
differed over whether respect for the Court and the legitimacy of its 
decisionmaking depends more on their adhering to decisions of 
which some of them disapprove for the sake of maintaining stability 
and continuity in constitutional law or on their overruling such de-
cisions and precipitating at least short-term disruption of constitu-
tional law in the hope of firmly setting constitutional adjudication 
back on the right track. 
One such disagreement occurred on the last day of the 1990 
Term in Harme/in v. Michigan.Is In Harmelin, the five-member 
majority (consisting of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Souter) upheld Michigan's imposi-
tion of a life sentence without parole for drug possession, but split 
over the necessity and the criteria for overruling Solem v. Helm.i 6 
In Solem, the Court had found that a mandatory life sentence with-
out the possibility of parole for the commission of at least three 
felonies violated the principle that the Eighth Amendment prohibits 
imposition of a sentence that is disproportionate to the severity of a 
crime. On behalf of himself and the Chief Justice, Justice Scalia 
argued that Solem should be overruled because it was erroneously 
reasoned, set forth an unworkable standard, and conflicted with the 
original understanding of the Eighth Amendment and other case 
law.11 
But Justices O'Connor and Souter joined in Justice Kennedy's 
separate concurrence rejecting Justice Scalia's arguments for over-
ruling Solem. Instead, Justice Kennedy maintained that even 
though Solem could have been better reasoned and could have ar-
ticulated a more workable standard, the Court could remedy those 
problems by narrowing but not overruling Solem. Is 
A similar division among the Reagan and Bush appointees oc-
curred near the end of the 1991 Term in Lee v. Weisman.I9 Lee 
raised, inter alia, the issue whether the Court should have overruled 
the besieged tripartite test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman 2o for 
15. IllS. Ct. 2680 (1991). 
16. 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
17. Harmelin, Ill S. Ct. at 2686-2701. 
18. ld. at 2702-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
In dissent, Justice White (joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens) found that neither the 
history nor the case law regarding the Eighth Amendment supported Justice Scalia's conclu-
sion that the Eighth Amendment contained no proportionality principle. As for Justice Ken-
nedy's analysis, Justice White argued that it was "contradicted by the language of Solem itself 
and by our other cases interpreting the Eighth Amendment." Harme/in, Ill S. Ct. at 2709, 
2714 (White, J., dissenting). 
19. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). 
20. 403 u.s. 602 (1971). 
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determining whether governmental actions violate the establish-
ment clause.21 On behalf of the majority (consisting of himself and 
Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter and Blackmun), Justice Ken-
nedy struck down a middle school graduation prayer on the 
grounds of constitutional stare decisis. Rather than expanding on 
his earlier criticism of the Lemon test,22 he explained that 
the controlling precedents as they relate to prayer and religious 
exercise in primary and secondary public schools compel the 
holding here that the policy of the city of Providence is an un-
constitutional one. We can decide the case without reconsidering 
the general constitutional framework by which public schools' 
efforts to accommodate religion are measured.23 
Consequently, he declined to "accept the invitation of the petition-
ers and amicus the United States to reconsider our decision in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman."24 
In a separate concurrence joined by Justices' O'Connor and 
Stevens, Justice Souter emphasized that "[h]ere, as elsewhere, we 
should stick to [the settled law] absent some compelling reason to 
discard it. "25 He found that "on balance, history neither contra-
dicts nor warrants reconsideration of the settled principle that the 
Establishment Clause forbids support for religion in general no less 
than support for one religion or some. "26 He concluded that: 
[w]hile we may be unable to know for certain what the Framers 
meant by the Clause, we do know that, around the time of its 
ratification, a respectable body of opinion supported a considera-
bly broader reading than petitioners urge upon us. This consis-
tency [of the evidence of the framers' and ratifiers' intent] with 
textual considerations is enough to preclude fundamentally reex-
amining our settled law.27 
In a dissent joined by the Chief Justice and Justices White and 
Thomas, Justice Scalia rejected the majority's reliance on establish-
ment clause precedents. First, he argued that the majority misread 
those decisions, which he understood as turning on the incompati-
21. See Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2654 (describing Lemon's three-part test as requiring "a gov-
ernmental practice [to] (I) reflect a clearly secular purpose; (2) have a primary effect that 
neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) avoid excessive government entanglement with 
religion"). 
22. See, e.g., Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 657 (1989) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
23. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2655. 
24. ld. 
25. Id. at 2668 (Souter, J., concurring) 
26. I d. at 26 70. 
27. I d. at 2676. 
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bility between prayer and the classroom setting "in which legal co-
ercion to attend school . . . provides the ultimate backdrop" and 
therefore raised "special concerns regarding state interference with 
the liberty of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their chil-
dren."2s Second, Justice Scalia urged abandoning the Court's "reli-
gion-clause jurisprudence" (particularly Lemon) because it "reli[ed] 
on formulaic abstractions that are not derived from, but positively 
conflict with, our long-accepted constitutional traditions [including 
prayer at public school graduations]."29 
Six days after the Court decided Lee, Casey gave rise to the 
most strident disagreements yet over the degree of deference that 
the Reagan and Bush Justices owed to a prominent liberal prece-
dent, namely, Roe v. Wade. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Sou-
ter, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, made a bare majority 
to reaffirm the central abortion-rights holding of Roe. The three 
swing Justices made a plurality to adopt a new "undue burden" 
standard for measuring the validity of state abortion regulations. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia, joined by 
Justice Thomas, would have overruled Roe and permitted state reg-
ulations and restrictions that are rationally related to a legitimate 
state interest. 
In an extensive discussion of the doctrine of stare decisis, the 
majority initially acknowledged that, in reexamining precedents, the 
Court balances competing interests: "its judgment is informed by a 
series of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test 
the consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the 
rule of law, and to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and 
overruling a prior case."Jo It explained that these concerns led the 
Court to: 
ask whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defy-
ing practical workability; whether the rule is subject to a kind of 
reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences 
of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; 
whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have 
left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine; 
or whether the facts have so changed or come to be seen so differ-
ently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or 
28. ld. at 2684, 2685 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
29. Id. at 2685. 
30. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2808. Cf. Gerhardt, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 116-22 (cited in 
note 14) (maintaining that the Court's review of its precedents typically consists of each 
Justice's balancing of his or her views on how the Constitution should be interpreted and the 
need to submerge those views for the sake of such social and institutional values as continuity 
and stability in constitutiona11aw). 
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justification. 3t 
The opinion dealt briefly with the workability question, finding 
that the determinations required under Roe "fall within judicial 
competence,"32 and turned to the more difficult issue of reliance. 
"Since the classic case for weighing reliance heavily in favor of fol-
lowing the earlier rule occurs in the commercial context, [citing 
Payne v. Tennessee 33], where advance planning of great precision is 
most obviously a necessity, it is no cause for surprise that some 
would find no reliance worthy of consideration in support of 
Roe."34 "[C]ognizable reliance," however, goes beyond "specific in-
stances of sexual activity."3s The majority explained that 
for two decades of economic and social developments, people 
have organized intimate relationships and made choices that de-
fine their views of themselves and their places in society, in reli-
ance on the availability of abortion in the event that 
contraception should fail. The ability of women to participate 
equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been 
facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.36 
The majority then considered Roe in the context of other deci-
sions, finding its doctrine neither anomalous nor obsolete. And it 
saw supervening developments in medical knowledge and technol-
ogy as requiring no more than flexibility in the application of Roe's 
central holding, rather than its overruling.37 
Recognizing that Roe is no ordinary precedent, the majority 
broadened its discussion to consider arguable parallels with two 
abandoned lines of cases, those identified with Lochner v. New 
York 3s and Plessy v. Ferguson.39 It viewed the nullification of the 
constitutional doctrines of liberty of contract and separate but equal 
as resting on major changes in facts or understanding, beyond mere 
changes in Court membership or disagreement with the original 
holdings, that made reconsideration "not only justified but re-
quired."40 With Roe, the majority saw not just a threat to the 
Court's legitimacy from too-frequent vacillation but an analogy to 
31. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2808-09 (citations omitted). 
32. ld. at 2809. 
33. Ill S. Ct. 2597 ( 1991 ), overruling South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 ( 1989) 
and Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987). 
34. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2809. 
35. ld. at 2809. 
36. ld. 
37. See id. at 2809-11. 
38. 198 u.s. 45 (1905). 
39. 163 u.s. 537 (1896). 
40. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2812. 
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Brown v. Board of Education41 in that in both that case and in Roe 
the Court had called on "the contending sides of a national contro-
versy to end their national division by accepting a common man-
date rooted in the Constitution. "42 The majority explained that 
[a] decision to overrule Roe's essential holding under the existing 
circumstances would address error, if error there was, at the cost 
of both profound and unnecessary damage to the Court's legiti-
macy, and to the Nation's commitment to the rule of law. It is 
therefore imperative to adhere to the essence of Roe's original 
decision[.]43 
In an unprecedented move, Justice Souter expressed similar 
sentiments in an oral statement from the bench after Justice 
O'Connor had announced the Court's ruling in Casey. Echoing his 
earlier concurrence in Lee, Justice Souter declared that, "To over-
rule [Roe] would subvert the Court's legitimacy beyond any reason-
able question. If the Court were undermined, the country would 
also be so."44 He agreed that "Roe has not proven unworkable in 
practice." 45 
The partial dissents of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Scalia, each joined by the other and by Justices White and Thomas, 
would have found the overruling of Roe fully consistent with the 
respect due to constitutional stare decisis. Both opinions strongly 
emphasized the gravity of what they viewed as the error of Roe,46 
and Justice Scalia likened the case to the dishonor of Dred Scott47 
rather than to the abandonment of Lochner and Plessy.4s Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist's opinion contended that the prevailing opinion 
abandoned rather than adhered to stare decisis. He pointed to its 
modification of the Roe approach, including overrulings of Roe's 
trimester framework49 and parts of two other decisions. so He dis-
agreed point-by-point with its arguments on precedent and the plu-
41. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
42. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2815. 
43. ld. at 2816. 
44. Jeanne Cummings, Supreme Court Upholds Most of Pennsylvania Abortion Law, 
The Atlanta Journal and Constitution, June 29, 1992, § A, p. I. 
45. ld. 
46. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2855 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part); and id. at 2875-76, 2882, 2884-85 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part). 
47. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
48. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2883 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part). 
49. ld. at 112 S. Ct. at 2817-18. 
50. ld. at 2816 (overruling in part Thornburgh v. American College a/Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), and City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive 
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983)). 
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rality's reformulated "undue burden" standard.st He concluded 
that 
[s]trong and often misguided criticism of a decision should not 
render the decision immune from reconsideration, lest a fetish for 
legitimacy penalize freedom of expression. . . . The sum of the 
joint opinion's labors in the name of stare decisis and "legiti-
macy" is this: Roe v. Wade stands as a sort of judicial Potemkin 
Village, which may be pointed out to passers by as a monument 
to the importance of adhering to precedent. But behind the 
facade, an entirely new method of analysis, without any roots in 
constitutional law, is imported to decide the constitutionality of 
state laws regulating abortion. Neither stare decisis nor "legiti-
macy" [is] truly served by such an effort.s2 
Both the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia challenged what the 
majority characterized as the traditional rule of constitutional stare 
decisis. Relying on his opinion in Payne, which had overruled two 
Rehnquist Court decisions on the Eighth Amendment,s3 the Chief 
Justice suggested that ultimately the standard is error, and, once 
that is shown, then overruling is in order.s4 Justice Scalia strongly 
agreed with the latter point but argued further that precedents must 
give way when they conflict with the well established practices of 
popular majorities, which had for years prior to Roe had the chance 
to regulate abortions.ss 
II 
Neither the plurality's nor the dissent's approach to constitu-
tional stare decisis in Casey is without problems. Both fail to con-
sider fully the best arguments for, or implications of, their 
respective positions. 
For example, the Casey plurality-Justices O'Connor, Ken-
nedy and Souter, made two basic errors with respect to constitu-
tional stare decisis. First, it failed to show why the arguments it 
gave for reaffirming Roe's central holding did not conflict with its 
joining the Chief Justice and Justices White, Scalia and Thomas in 
overruling the trimester framework set forth in Roe as well as parts 
of two other abortion decisions, in each of which the Burger Court 
had expressly reaffirmed Roe.s6 The plurality's only explanation for 
51. Id. at 2857-64. 
52. I d. at 2866-67. 
53. Payne, Ill S. Ct. 2597. 
54. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2860-64 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part). 
55. ld. at 2873-74 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
56. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 772; Akron, 462 U.S. at 419-20. 
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the latter two overrulings was that 
[t]o the extent [those two cases] find a constitutional violation 
when the government requires, as it does here, the giving of 
truthful, nonmisleading information about the nature of the 
abortion procedure, the attendant health risks and those of child-
birth, and the 'probable gestational age' of the fetus, those cases 
are inconsistent with Roe's acknowledgement of an important in-
terest in potential life, and are overruled.S7 
77 
Yet the plurality did not hesitate to join the Chief Justice and Jus-
tices White, Scalia and Thomas in following other precedents to up-
hold Pennsylvania's requirements for informed consent; a 24-hour 
waiting period; and, for underage pregnant women, parental con-
sent (with a judicial bypass).ss The plurality's selective disdain for 
precedent undermined the credibility of its contentions that it was 
not articulating a different standard from what Roe had set forth for 
measuring the constitutionality of abortion laws and that case law 
subsequent to Roe had not undermined Roe's workability and 
coherence. 
If the Casey plurality had in fact applied Justice Souter's prin-
ciple that decisions should be overruled only if there are compelling 
reasons to do so, it probably would not have overruled any aspects 
of Roe and the other two abortion decisions. The mere identifica-
tion of some potential inconsistencies between cases hardly qualifies 
as a compelling reason for overruling. Justice Stevens showed in his 
concurrence, for example, that even under the plurality's "undue 
burden" standard, none of Pennsylvania's abortion regulations 
should have passed constitutional muster.s9 Justice Blackmun simi-
larly argued that Roe required subjecting abortion regulations to 
strict scrutiny, under which none of the Pennsylvania abortion laws 
would have been found to have been constitutional,60 and that am-
ple precedent had already struck down state laws similar to the 
Pennsylvania regulations upheld by the majority.6I 
But by joining in overruling parts of three abortion cases, in-
cluding Roe, the plurality clearly signaled that changes in the law 
would follow from its application of the "undue burden" standard 
and from its disagreement(s) with how previous Justices had ap-
plied Roe to various abortion regulations. Casey preserved only 
marginal certainty with regard to the constitutional law of abortion, 
57. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2800. 
58. See id. at 2832-33. 
59. ld. at 2842-43 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
60. Id. at 2845-54 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
61. ld. at 2850-54. 
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because it raised doubts about which kinds of abortion laws (includ-
ing those previously adjudicated) could now pass constitutional 
muster under the "undue burden" standard. 
The Casey plurality's second mistake was miscalculating the 
nature of the reliance interests at work in Casey. Even though the 
plurality had acknowledged that women rely on Roe in planning 
their intimate relationships, it did so in light of what it regarded as 
the basic rule of constitutional stare decisis announced in Payne (in 
which the plurality had joined Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
White and Scalia) that "the classic case for weighing reliance heav-
ily in favor of following the earlier rule occurs in the commercial 
context ... where advance planning of great precision is most obvi-
ously a necessity."62 
The Casey plurality erred, however, in imagining that the most 
pertinent reliance interests involved in abortion cases occur prior to 
conception and in assuming that concerns about reliance differ de-
pending upon the kind of constitutional right. In fact, women do 
not just count on Roe prior to engaging in sexual intercourse; they 
also rely on Roe after they have become pregnant (many times 
against their wishes), at which moment they face the not-theoretical 
and often-difficult choice of whether to carry the pregnancy to term. 
It is at this latter point that women have depended on Roe in over a 
million cases a year because the Supreme Court has said that the 
Constitution protects women's autonomy in making reproductive 
choices. 63 Nor should the Court easily abdicate its responsibility 
for having made such reliance possible in the first place. Moreover, 
the autonomy to make these choices without governmental regula-
tion means at least as much (if not more) to women as the expecta-
tion of the Court's continued adherence to its property and contract 
decisions means to commercial enterprises. 
Finally, no Court prior to Payne had ever attempted to create a 
distinction among civil liberties for purposes of stare decisis. The 
idea that because commercial interests can arguably be defined 
more precisely than personal, noneconomic ones, the former some-
how require more respect than the latter for purposes of stare deci-
sis, trivializes the degree to which the Court's noncommercial, civil 
liberties decisions inalterably shape the ways in which many people 
live and even die. As Justice Thomas ironically argued (and echoed 
the Court's traditional practice) in his confirmation hearings, the 
Court's standard for overruling precedents "should be as uniform as 
62. ld. at 2809 (citing Payne). 
63. See David Lauter, Decision Raises Question About "Undue Burden," L.A. Times, 
June 30, 1992, at AI, col. 6 (referring to approximately 1.5 million abortions annually). 
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possible"64 and "the cases in the individual rights area deserve the 
greatest protection. "6s 
The plurality's problems with precedent pale, however, in com-
parison with the magnitude of the four difficulties affecting Chief 
Justice Rehnquist's and Justice Scalia's approach to constitutional 
stare decisis. First, they both mischaracterized the Court's tradi-
tional position on stare decisis. The Chief Justice argued, for exam-
ple, that the Court has generally followed the practice of overruling 
precedents it has deemed to have been erroneously reasoned.66 Cit-
ing his opinion in Payne, he argued that "[o]ver the past 21 years[,] 
the Court has overruled in whole or in part 34 of its previous consti-
tutional decisions. "67 But a close reading indicates that perhaps as 
few as five of the thirty-four opinions cited by the Chief Justice-all 
five of which he had written himself-involved the Court's overrul-
ing of some prior decision(s) on the sole basis of the precedent hav-
ing been reasoned badly.6s The remaining twenty-nine opinions, 
including two authored by then-Justice Rehnquist, appear to 
ground the overruling on the bases of erroneous reasoning and the 
unworkability or outmoded nature of the overruled precedent or the 
existence of subsequent, inconsistent case law. Thus, a more accu-
rate restatement of the conventional practice regarding constitu-
tional stare decisis came from Justice Souter, who argued in Lee69 
and again (in his oral statement) in Casey1o that overrulings should 
occur only when error and some other serious development(s) re-
quire it. 
For his part, Justice Scalia argued in Payne, Lee and Casey that 
the rule of stare decisis requires the Court to respect "longstanding 
traditions of American society . . . proscrib[ing] [certain con-
duct.]"71 But no member of the Court other than Justice Scalia has 
ever recognized, much less endorsed, any similar rule of constitu-
tional stare decisis. Indeed, if one were to follow Justice Scalia's 
edict that "stare decisis ought to be applied even to the doctrine of 
stare decisis,"n it is clear that no precedents (other than those 
64. Ruth Marcus, Thomas Refuses to State View on Abortion Issue: Nominee Steadfast 
amid Senators' Questions, Washington Post, Sept. 12, 1991, at AI, A4, col. I. 
65. ld. at A4, col. 5. 
66. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2808. 
67. ld. at 2863 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in pan and dissenting in 
pan). 
68. See Gerhardt, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 112 (cited in note 14). 
69. See Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2668. 
70. See Cummings, The Atlanta Journal and Constitution (cited in note 44). 
71. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2874 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in pan and dissent-
ing in pan). 
72. ld. at 2881. 
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which he wrote) support Justice Scalia's approach to precedent. 
Moreover, Justice Scalia conceded that enduring practices of 
majorities do not deserve deference when they conflict with the 
clear textual mandates of the Constitution, as he suggested was the 
case in Loving v. Virginia,73 in which the Court had struck down the 
longstanding practice of many states to outlaw interracial mar-
riages. 74 Yet, if the longevity or political popularity of certain prac-
tices do not insulate them from being struck down when they 
conflict with the Constitution, then the question of their constitu-
tionality does not tum on stare decisis but rather the clarity of the 
constitutional text (and other legitimate sources of constitutional 
decision). 
Second, the Chief Justice's and Justice Scalia's preference for 
overruling erroneously reasoned decisions is susceptible to attack 
for being even more political in its origins and applications than the 
majority's decision to reaffirm Roe. Justice Scalia tried to sidestep 
the majority's charge that his vote to overrule Roe could be viewed 
as being at least in part attributable to political pressure on the 
Court: 
[W]e have been subjected to what the Court calls 'political pres-
sure' by both sides of this issue. Maybe today's decision not to 
overrule Roe will be seen as buckling to pressure from that direc-
tion. Instead of engaging in the hopeless task of predicting pub-
lic perception-a job not for lawyers but for political campaign 
managers-the Justices should do what is legally right by asking 
two questions: (I) Was Roe correctly decided? (2) Has Roe suc-
ceeded in producing a settled body of law? If the answer to both 
questions is no, Roe should undoubtedly be overruled. "75 
Yet Justice Scalia's response obscured the political implications 
of the Casey dissents. He never commented on the striking coinci-
dence that three of the four Justices urging the overruling of Roe 
had been appointed by presidents who had expressly pledged in 
their campaigns to appoint Justices who would do precisely that. 
Justice Scalia also neglected to acknowledge that any weakening of 
Roe strictly coincided with the arrivals on the Court of Presidents' 
Reagan's and Bush's appointees. For example, each of the three 
cases cited by the Chief Justice as showing that conflicts over Roe 
had prevented majorities from forming in recent abortion cases did 
so only as a direct result of the participation of these new Justices.76 
73. 388 u.s. 1 (1967). 
74. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2874 n.l. 
75. ld. at 2884 (citations omitted). 
76. See id. at 2858 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting 
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Nor did Justice Thomas's vote in his first abortion case to overrule 
Roe surprise anyone who had read his pre-judicial writings and 
speeches. 77 
By being willing to go some distance from the expectations of 
the presidents who appointed them, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy 
and Souter reached more of- a semblance of neutrality than the 
Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas achieved. Unlike Jus-
tice Scalia, they heeded (at least partially) Justice Stewart's warning 
that 
[a] basic change in the law upon a ground no firmer than a 
change in our membership invites the popular misconception 
that this institution is little different from the two political 
branches of the Government. No misconception could do more 
lasting injury to this Court and to the system of law which it is 
our abiding mission to serve. 78 
While a President unquestionably has the power to shift the direc-
tion of constitutional law through his judicial appointments, over-
rulings that are attributable solely to-and occur immediately 
after-changes in the Court's composition leave the unmistakable 
impression of politics rather than legal judgment guiding the Court. 
In his partial concurrence, Justice Stevens underscored the fact 
that it was only the Court's newer members who had made Roe's 
overruling even a possibility: "[i]n the last nineteen years, fifteen 
Justices have confronted the basic issue presented in Roe. Of those, 
eleven have voted as the majority does today ... [Only] four-all of 
whom happen to be on the Court today-have reached the opposite 
conclusion. "79 
Third, the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia's approach to consti-
tutional stare decisis injects too much instability into constitutional 
law. Even if the dissent had prevailed in Casey, it is likely that their 
victory would have been short-lived. The appointment of Justices 
bent on overturning such precedents as Roe produces further insta-
bility in constitutional law by encouraging the future appointments 
of Justices who would try to undo decisions restricting abortion 
rights and who would probably not have any more respect for con-
in part) (citing Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990); Hodgson v. 
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 
(1989)). 
77. See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, Divided Justice: A Commentary on the Nomina-
tion and Confirmation of Justice Thomas, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 969, 981, 983, 986-87 
(1992). 
78. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 416 U.S. 600, 636 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting), cited at 
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2814. 
79. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2838 n.l (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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stitutional stare decisis than the Casey dissenters. Such instability 
ultimately fosters an image of constitutional law as being nothing 
more than politics being carried on in a different forum. 
Indeed, the plurality saw the dangerous potential in the insta-
bility brought about by the Chief Justice's and Justice Scalia's atti-
tude about constitutional stare decisis: 
There is, first, a point beyond which frequent overruling would 
overtax the country's belief in the Court's good faith. . . . [T]here 
is a limit to the amount of error that can plausibly be imputed to 
prior courts. If that limit should be exceeded, disturbances of 
prior rulings would be taken as evidence that justifiable reexami-
nation of principle had given way to drives for particular results 
in the short term. The legitimacy of the Court would fade with 
the frequency of its vacillation. . . . [Second, when the Court 
tries to resolve a particularly controversial constitutional con-
flict,] only the most convincing justification under accepted stan-
dards of precedent could suffice to demonstrate that a later 
decision overruling the first was anything but a surrender to 
political pressure, and an unjustified repudiation of the principle 
on which the Court staked its authority in the first instance. So 
to overrule under fire in the absence of the most compelling rea-
son to reexamine a watershed decision would subvert the Court's 
legitimacy beyond any serious question. "so 
Fourth, the Chief Justice's and Justice Scalia's approach to 
constitutional stare decisis casts serious doubt on the legitimacy of 
judicial review itself.si Normally, the Court expects other branches 
to comply with its exercises of judicial review (even to strike down 
certain laws) as binding rules of law. The Casey dissenters' urge to 
overrule Roe--or any precedent with a heated and repeated dissent 
with which they agree-because it was wrongly decided shows that 
they lack confidence in and prefer not to follow the Court's previ-
ously articulated rules of law on abortion (and many other sub-
jects). The dissent's reasoning invites the states to ignore existing 
rules of law in order to pass legislation to test the resiliency of any 
decision with which the dissent disagrees, including Roe. 
In his final dissent, Justice Marshall in Payne denounced such 
invitations as fundamentally at odds with the rule of law. He chas-
tised the majority for "invit[ing]" the states "to renew the very poli-
cies deemed unconstitutional in the hope that this Court may now 
80. Id. at 2815. 
81. In this regard, I refer to a strong version of judicial review under which the Court 
expects the other branches to follow its lead, see, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. I (1958), 
rather than a weaker form under which the Court might wait for the other branches to ask it 
to resolve their disputes. 
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reverse course, even if it has only recently reaffirmed the constitu-
tional liberty in question."s2 As long as the states perceive that at 
least three Justices are determined to overrule Roe in accordance 
with the political will of the presidents who appointed them, it is 
likely that political forces will continue to vie for control of the 
power to appoint Supreme Court Justices. 
Apart from the problems plaguing the Chief Justice's and Jus-
tice Scalia's statements on constitutional stare decisis, two other dif-
ficulties undermine Justice Scalia's position. First, Justice Scalia 
showed disdain for the very majoritarian process he has so often 
praised. In commenting on the degree to which the Casey major-
ity's personal values rather than legal judgment dictated the out-
come in the case, he suggested that one harmful byproduct was that 
confirmation hearings for new Justices should deteriorate into 
question-and-answer sessions in which Senators go through a list 
of their constituents' most favored and disfavored alleged consti-
tutional rights, and seek the nominee's commitment to support 
or oppose them. Value judgments, after all, should be voted on, 
not dictated; and if our Constitution has somehow accidentally 
committed them to the Supreme Court, at least we can have a 
sort of plebiscite each time a new nominee to that body is put 
forward. "83 
Justice Scalia's concern was clearly with the efforts of senators 
trying to protect certain interests through judicial appointments 
rather than the legislative process. Nevertheless, he overlooked the 
well-established practice of the Senate to base confirmation deci-
sions in part on the nominee's views regarding precedents and pre-
viously unrecognized rights.s4 Senatorial advice and consent 
remains a critical political (or majoritarian) check on the process of 
selecting Supreme Court Justices. By vesting confirmation power in 
an electorally accountable body, the Constitution makes it legiti-
mate for the American people to share their concerns about the 
Court's direction with their senators. Majoritarianism is also at 
work in presidential elections, where the candidates-even in the 
most recent contest between President Bush and then-Governor 
Clintons5-often have promised certain kinds of Supreme Court ap-
pointments. While judicial nominees could refuse to answer ques-
82. Payne, IllS. Ct. at 2619,2621 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
83. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2885 (cited in note 10) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in 
part and dissenting in part). 
84. See Gerhardt, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 975 (cited in note 77); see also Michael J. 
Gerhardt, Interpreting Bark (Book Review), 75 Cornell L. Rev. 1358, 1387 (1990). 
85. See, e.g., Ruth Marcus, At Issue: Abortion; On Supponfor Choice and Limits, Bush-
Clinton Contrasts Are Sharp, Washington Post, Aug. 16, 1992, at A21, col. I. 
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tions during presidential interviews or confirmation hearings about 
which precedents they would like to perpetuate (as Justice Scalia 
refused to do to the Senate's lasting consternation), the people's 
preferences on which rights the Court should continue to protect is 
a plainly relevant criterion for appointment to the Court. For ex-
ample, if most Americans agree with the Supreme Court that there 
is a fundamental right to choose to have an abortion but political 
forces are working within the system to change the Court and to 
take that freedom away, then the Constitution permits pro-choice 
Americans to voice their concerns in the elections of presidents and 
senators and in the confirmation process. 
Second, Justice Scalia's argument that Roe should be overruled 
because it is as morally repugnant as Dred Scott loses force in his 
hands because he overuses it. Unquestionably, many people believe 
in good faith that the strongest argument for overruling Roe is that 
it is just like Dred Scott and Plessy in that it is so badly reasoned and 
has produced such morally reprehensible consequences that it re-
quires overruling as soon as possible. Yet, according to Justice 
Scalia, the Court should overrule as erroneously reasoned and mor-
ally repugnant numerous precedents involving such varied subject 
matters as the religion clauses, separation of powers, substantive 
due process, proportionality of punishment, obscenity, criminal jury 
selection, negative commerce clause, takings and affirmative ac-
tion.s6 If as many decisions are as morally defective (or governed 
by the personal values of other Justices) as Justice Scalia believes, 
then it is a wonder the Court still retains any authority at all. 
The problem may be less with most constitutional doctrine be-
ing morally repugnant and wrongly reasoned-the two seem to go 
hand-in-hand in Justice Scalia's mind-than with Justice Scalia's 
having a constitutional vision that is seriously at odds with the 
moral tone of most twentieth century constitutional doctrine. In 
the final analysis, the pressures of being a Justice on a collegial 
court require someone with Justice Scalia's beliefs either to defend 
more openly (or persuasively) the serious social upheaval his devia-
tion from standard judicial practice would entail or to be more will-
ing to follow the lead of most Justices to balance his normative 
views on how the Constitution should be interpreted and the need 
to submerge those views for the sake of such institutional or social 
values as stability and continuity in constitutional decisionmaking. 
86. See Gerhardt, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 122-23 nn.249-59 and accompanying text 
(cited in note 14 ). 
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CONCLUSION 
The debate over Roe's future will hardly end with Casey. Roe's 
fate depends on the composition of the Courts7 and on which ap-
proach to constitutional stare decisis continues to dominate the 
Supreme Court. 
On the one hand, the O'Connor-Kennedy-Souter position 
holds that constitutional precedents should only be overruled if 
there are compelling reasons to do so and if no other less disruptive 
alternative is available. This approach has the advantage of ensur-
ing a significant degree of stability and continuity in constitutional 
law and promoting decisionmaking that builds incrementally on the 
experiences of prior Justices. This approach is likely to prevail in 
constitutional adjudication because it tracks the popular practice of 
Supreme Court Justices to look for something more serious than 
mere error as the basis for overruling precedents and exhibits a rea-
sonable willingness to balance the competing interests at play when-
ever a landmark Supreme Court decision is being reconsidered. 
On the other hand, the need to overrule precedents deemed 
erroneous, as urged by the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and 
Thomas, risks destroying the values associated with fidelity to pre-
cedent. Abandoning Roe (or any precedent for no better reason 
than that a majority can show that it could have been better rea-
soned) violates traditional notions of neutrality, equality, consis-
tency, stability, and efficiency in constitutional decisionmaking. In 
addition, the Rehnquist-Scalia-Thomas approach raises serious 
questions about the appropriate standards for overturning well-eo-
trenched decisions and about the legitimacy of judicial review as 
producing rules of law that can and should bind each branch of 
government, including the Court. 
Perhaps most importantly, a majority of the Court should con-
tinue to reject the Chief Justice's and Justice Scalia's approach to 
constitutional stare decisis because it risks irreparable damage to the 
Court's prestige and to constitutional law. Their approach has the 
potential to increase politicization of the Court and instability in 
constitutional law. For example, despite Justice Scalia's hopes to 
the contrary,ss the Court's overruling of Roe would not end the 
87. Cf. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2854-55 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) ("I am 83 years old. I cannot remain on this Court forever, and when I do step down, 
the confirmation process for my successor well may focus on the issue before us today. That, 
I regret, may be exactly where the choice between the two worlds will be made."). 
88. In Webster, Justice Scalia explained his "compelling reasons" for overruling Roe: 
"(We] can now look forward to at least another Term with carts full of mail from the public, 
and streets full of demonstrators, urging us [to] follow the popular will . . . Of the four 
courses we might have chosen today-to reaffirm Roe, to overrule it explicitly, to overrule it 
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marches around the Court, because such a decision would positively 
reinforce the uses of protest and political muscle to influence the 
selection of Justices and the Court's position on abortion. 
In addition, returning most, if not all, of the serious questions 
about abortion to the state and federal political processes would not 
end the controversy over the Court's role in protecting abortion 
rights. Until a majority of the Court holds a firm position support-
ing Roe, the political conflict over Roe will persist rather than end. 
Abandoning Roe at this juncture would make the Court's rulings on 
abortion appear to be guided more by certain political choices 
rather than responsible legal decisionmaking on the part of a major-
ity of Justices. For as long as some Reagan and Bush appointees to 
the Court seek the overruling of Roe in striking conformity with the 
wishes of the presidents who appointed them, Roe's defenders and 
abortion-rights advocates have little choice but to wonder that if 
politics could undo Roe, perhaps politics can restore it. 
sub silentio, or to avoid the question-the last is the least responsible." Webster, 492 U.S. at 
535 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
